Unmasking Indian Secularism – Free Chapter
Breaking the Impasse
‘No matter how hard the past is, you can always begin again.’ —Buddha
I am one of Salman Rushdie’s metaphorical ‘midnight’s children’, born on the morrow of Indian independence in a climate fraught with tense Hindu–Muslim relations in the wake of Partition. My generation of Hindus and Muslims grew up under the lingering shadow of Partition—two traumatized communities struggling to come to terms with its aftermath and, more importantly, struggling to reconcile with each other. Muslims carried additional baggage: the perception that even if they were not directly responsible for the country’s division, they were still somehow complicit by virtue of being part of the larger Muslim ‘ummah’; in other words, all Muslims were seen to bear some responsibility for the creation of Pakistan. The Right, which primarily consists of Hindu nationalists, perceived them as interlopers trying to have their cake (their ‘own’ homeland in Pakistan) and eat it too (a privileged life in India).
On the other hand, Muslims felt they were being unfairly targeted for the sins of a few, and rather than being hailed for foregoing the safety of a Muslim state, they were portrayed as outsiders in the land of their ancestors. They felt anxious about their future.It was against this background of mutual suspicion that the foundations of secular India were laid: not exactly propitious circumstances for experimenting with an alien and culturally sensitive concept that had proved controversial even in the lands of its birth—the liberal western democracies. Looking back, in the light of subsequent events, it is easy to question that decision. To be sure, it was a deliberate choice driven by Jawaharlal Nehru’s westernized liberal outlook. There was no attempt to explore an indigenous model: a system that would have recognized the predominantly Hindu nature of Indian society without necessarily declaring India a Hindu state.
But, as the cliché goes, hindsight is a wonderful thing. But at the time, it seemed like a sensible choice even if not everyone, even in the Congress party, fully bought it. Primarily, it was designed to offer a sense of security and inclusion to a traumatized minority community concerned about its place in a Hindu majority state. But it was also a politically smart move to score moral brownie points over Pakistan. Here was a modern, democratic and secular India committing itself to protect its minorities and uphold the rule of law—thus asserting its higher moral and cultural values vis-à-vis a divisive theocracy founded on medieval-era values. There was certainly a hint of virtue-signalling in this ‘inclusion’.The more cynical view—initially confined to the Hindu Right, but shared more widely today—is that the whole secularism project was really an expedient by the Congress party to win over the Muslim community to cash in for its votes, an argument that the BJP would later use to successfully mobilize opinion against secularism, calling it ‘pseudo-secularism’. It accused the Congress party of Muslim ‘appeasement’ to build a Muslim ‘vote bank’ while ignoring Hindu concerns. The efficacy of the secularism project is debatable, but the problem is that much of the debate has become too politicized to allow an objective evaluation. And it is not a recent change; it has been so for as long as I remember. Most of the discussion has been shaped by ideological and political party lines reducing it to a Liberal versus Right and, worse, Hindu versus Muslim issue. While advocates of secularism hail it as the only show in sight and are not willing even to consider any other alternative, its opponents find no advantage to it, rubbishing it as a western import and a liberal conspiracy against Hindus.
Ordinary Hindus and Muslims have had little say in a discourse that has done so much to muddy community relations. If Hindu–Muslim relations are fraught today, it is largely because of the toxic political discourse over secularism dubbed a tu-tu-main-main (slanging match) between rival political parties. Notwithstanding the much-vaunted Ganga–Jamunitehzeeb (a fusion of Hindu-Muslim culture) and the liberal nostalgia for a ‘Hindu–Muslim bhai, bhai’ golden age, there is a long history of tensions between the two communities preceding Partition. But much of the post-Independence tensions and anti-Muslim sentiment can be traced to the heat generated by the political divide and the war of words over secularism; a war that critics of secularism, by being more vocal and belligerent, have won—convincing large swathes of the majority community that secularism is disadvantageous for them because it is predicated on the belief of prioritizing minority interests.The drip-drip effect of this relentless campaign claiming that secularism has undermined ‘Hindu pride’ and made them feel like aliens in their ‘own’ land—encapsulated in the BJP’s slogan, ‘garv se kaho, “Hum Hindu hain” [say it with pride, “We are Hindu”]’—has led to a steady erosion of support for secularism even among liberal Hindus. There has been a profound transformation of Indian attitudes towards the so-called ‘Muslim question’ tellingly referred to by many as an ‘unfinished business’ leftover from Partition. Privately, even some relatively moderate Hindus talk of the need for a ‘new deal’ focusing more on Muslim integration than reinforcing a minority mindset which they believe is what the constitutional settlement did in 1950. It suggested to Muslims that they deserved a special status and protection from a marauding Hindu majority. The result, they argue, was to create false expectations and a sense of entitlement among Muslims on the one hand, and resentment among Hindus, on the other. It didn’t help either side and instead sowed the seeds of divisions that were then used by the Hindu Right to advance its political agenda.In the aftermath of the 2002 communal violence in Gujarat, a group of left-liberal scholars—among them Martha Nussbaum, Christophe Jaffrelot and Neera Chandhoke—contributed to a volume, Will Secular India Survive?, edited by late historian Mushirul Hasan. Despite its funereal title, reflecting the widespread mood of doom and gloom that prevailed at the time, the book was remarkably upbeat about the future of Indian secularism. While not downplaying the threat it faced from Right-wing Hindu and Muslim groups, the writers believed that it was still the only viable show in town, given India’s cultural and religious diversity. Since then, however, some have started to row back on their optimism.1Prof. Chandhoke now acknowledges that ‘secularism is in crisis’, and that shoots of a ‘post-secular age’ are sprouting all over the world. There is need, she argues, to ‘re-examine’ the concept.Secularism, however, is in crisis, having been subjected to overuse. While a ‘thin’ and limited concept, secularism, in India for example, has had to shoulder the onerous task of nation building, take on the construction of a uniform civil code, bear responsibility for reorganizing and equalizing hierarchical relationships within religious communities, and even stand in for democracy. Unable to bear the weight of too many political projects, it shows signs of imploding. The west, in the meantime, seems to have given up on secularism and declared post-secularism. Moments of crisis provide an opportunity to re-examine a concept, clarify what it means and stands for, what the political context of the concept is. This moment can be productive because it compels us to reconsider the foundational presumptions of secularism and rescue this beleaguered concept not only from its opponents, but also its ardent supporters.
Another liberal political and social scientist, Rajeev Bhargava of the Delhi-based Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS) who has written extensively on the subject, fears that secularism is doomed in its current form and the only way to save it is a radical ‘course correction’. But that will require ‘self-reflexivity and self-criticism’ on the part of secularists who, according to him, are as much responsible for the state it is in as its ‘external’ enemies.Delivering the 2020 Asghar Ali Engineer Lecture, he said that the threat to secularism predated the coming to power of the Narendra Modi government though it has now become more serious. The fact was that secularism had long been ‘facing an internal threat in the sense that, the myopia, neglect, complacency, propensity for ritual hyperbole, weakness of will or failure of nerve of its proponents has also undermined it’.3This internal threat has also been political, social, cultural and intellectual… Those who defend secularism have frequently lost sight of the whole point behind a secular state, what secularism is for. More specifically, they do not fully understand what it was that gave Indian secularism its point and what made it.
This is open and vocal repudiation from a liberal proponent of secularism. It breaks a liberal taboo against acknowledging the failure of our experiment with secularism because doing so would mean admitting a historic failure. But, as Prof. Chandhoke’s candid observations illustrate, they are gradually coming round to the admission, however cautiously or grudgingly. There is no shame in accepting that India has changed and the 1950s Nehruvian model of western-style liberal/secular democracy is no longer in sync with today’s ‘new’ India. John Maynard Keynes, the great economist, famously said: ‘When the facts change, I change my mind. What do you do, sir?’ The old liberal order is struggling around the world in the face of resurgent ethnic nationalism. So, in a way, we’re all in it together when it comes to adjusting to new political fashions. Rather than keeping up the appearance that nothing has changed, it would be more honest to try and adapt to the changing political landscape. What we need is a new constitutional settlement between Hindus and Muslims—an arrangement that would reflect the altered national mood.The truth is that secularism, as practised over the past 70 years, has not worked, not only for Hindus, but also for Muslims—a fact often ignored. There’s an assumption that being in the minority, Muslims are ipso facto cheerleaders for secularism. The reality is rather different. Muslims have no particular attachment to the idea of secularism per se except as constitutional insurance against discrimination on religious grounds. They would have as happily gone along with any other arrangement—even a benign Hindu Rashtra which provided them security and dignity—that offered them the same protections as were promised by secularism. Remember, Muslims never campaigned for an explicitly secular India at the time of Independence, nor was their decision to stay in India necessarily influenced by the political nature of the state. They chose to remain, mainly because India was their ancestral land and they wished to continue to live here. Some held back from migrating to Pakistan because of economic reasons, and the lack of education and professional skills needed to start afresh in a new land. There were a number of reasons why they chose to remain in India, and certainly, the promise of equal rights helped, but secularism was not a decisive factor.The point I’m trying to labour is that secularism holds no special sanctity for Muslims; it’s just a means to an end, the end being a desire to live in peace and dignity. But after 70 years of secularism, that remains elusive. It hasn’t delivered what it promised on the tin.
Far from doing them any good, it has instead made them a target of backlash from Right-wing Hindu nationalists. The wholesale Muslim rejection of the Congress party and other assorted self-appointed secular saviours is a stark reflection of their deep disillusionment with the way secular political establishment has practised secularism.Indeed, I’ve noticed an alarming trend among some young Muslims put off by secular parties: they have cultivated a quiet admiration for populist Muslim demagogues like Asaduddin Owaisi of the All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen (AIMIM). They see him as a more authentic champion of their cause than their secular allies have proved to be. An argument I frequently hear is: ‘we tried secularists and were let down; now let’s give these guys a chance and see how it goes.’ It echoes the justification used by disillusioned Hindu Congress supporters to defend their embrace of the BJP. Owaisi admirers remain a minority, but a community feeling under siege, let down by secular friends, and fearful of its future can easily become desperate enough to seek solace in unlikely places.However, to cut to the chase, we are where we are; and endless post-mortems will not take us anywhere except to more finger-pointing, more acrimony and more bitterness. It’s time we started looking for a way out of the impasse. This means: stop obsessing about the past, take stock of where we are, and see how best to retrieve the situation before it worsens. Admittedly, given the current state of Hindu–Muslim relations, this will not be easy and require considerable compromises from both sides, particularly from the Muslim community, because ultimately, its future is at stake.Unfortunately, it doesn’t have the luxury of too many choices even as the current situation—irrespective of how it came about—is not sustainable. The community is politically isolated. Even its traditional allies—Congress and others—have started to abandon it, sensing that it has become a political liability in a climate where any overt support for Muslims is liable to be seen as being anti-Hindu.
The outcome of the Shaheen Bagh protests showed both the extent of its political isolation and the limits of mass action at a time when anti-Muslim sentiment has never been so pronounced. It has become a cliché to say that Indian Muslims are at the ‘crossroads’: I have been hearing this for as long as I can remember. Even in the so-called ‘good old days’ of Hindu–Muslim relations, they were portrayed as a community lost at the crossroads of its destiny. But if ever that description was true, it is today: the decisions Muslims take today will define their future in India for generations to come.There are only two choices before them; either remain bogged down in an endless debate about the past—who did what to whom and who is to blame for the current impasse—or to take a good hard look at their circumstances and start exploring a pragmatic and more effective approach. For the Hindu community, too, despite what the votaries of a Hindu Rashtra might claim, the reality is that it will not be easy to turn back the clock, uprooting the very foundations of the modern Indian state, and to replace it with a theocracy—something for which India has criticized other countries. Constitutional hurdles apart, it will be hard to sell it politically—and diplomatically—if sought to be pushed through without visible popular mandate such as through a referendum or credible nationwide public campaign calling for such a radical change. One way of seeking legitimacy will be for the BJP to include it in its election manifesto and seek votes promising a Hindu state—as it did over building a Ram Mandir on the site of Babri Masjid.But beyond the far-Right Hindutva bubble, will the mainstream Sangh Parivar leadership have the appetite for such a controversial move, given the potential reputational damage it is likely to do to India’s image as South Asia’s sole pillar of secular democracy in a region engulfed by religious and cultural strife?
Truth be told, both communities are constrained by objective factors and are not really in a position to have it all their way: neither an all-singing-all-dancing secular utopia sought by Muslims, nor an in-your-face Hindu Rashtra sought by Hindu nationalists.Therefore, any serious search for a solution will require a willingness on both sides to come together without preconditions and be ready to make compromises. It needs to be reiterated that Muslims should be prepared to forego more because—as I have argued before—they have more at stake, nothing short of their children and grandchildren’s future in India. They have nowhere else to go; indeed, they don’t want to go anywhere and wish to continue to live in India as they have for centuries. Securing a future in which they will not be discriminated against, feel safe, and be treated with respect is, thus, an existential issue—and to esolve it amicably, even if it means having to run an extra mile, should be the goal of the community at large.That Muslims surrender unconditionally to the Hindu Right is not the defense to be made here. That would not be consistent with my own idea of dignity and respect, but it is important not to forget what is at stake for them. And when the stakes are so high and the balance of power is so heavily tilted against you, there is nothing to be ashamed of in going the extra mile to secure your future.So, what might a re-examination of secularism entail for Muslims in real terms? For starters, a frank acceptance of the demise of secularism without further ado as to its causes or who is to blame. But, more importantly, a recognition of a marked pro-majoritarian tilt in the national mood. The view that the majority community has the first right over India has become deeply ingrained and is here to stay whether the Narendra Modi government stays or goes. The new citizenship law, which explicitly excludes Muslims and Christians from the category of minorities persecuted in other countries and entitled to Indian citizenship, effectively formalizes the conflation of India with Hindus.
The optimistic liberal belief that all they need is to defeat the BJP government and it will be back to business as usual is a fantasy. The sense of Hindu nationalism has become very real in recent years, and it will be hard to roll it back. The genie, as it were, has been let out of the bottle and there is no point pretending that it can be put back even if there was a political will to do so, of which, there is no evidence. It is not in the nature of genies to scurry back into the hole. Hoping for any other outcome just because it is fantastical will only prolong the agony and lead to more disappointment at the end of the day. The writing on the wall is clear, and to ignore it is to bury one’s head in the sand. Centrist parties, including the Congress, have already changed their tune, taking care to tone down their secular rhetoric and instead stress their Hinduness. Rahul Gandhi, the political scion of the Nehru–Gandhi family showed off his janeu (sacred thread) and talked about his gotra in the lead up to the 2019 general elections to woo the Hindu vote.5 ‘Rahul flaunts his “janeu”, pitches a journey to Kailash Mansarovar as the high point of his “Shiv bhakti”, criss-crosses temples across India during elections, sports a “tilak” on his forehead and tells the head priest in Pushkar that he is a Dattatreya Kaul Brahmin… The Congress has been desperate to claim the Hindu legacy,’ wrote Naghma Sahar ahead of the 2019 general elections.6Speaking in Parliament, after the election, Modi boasted that no political party had had the courage to even mention the word ‘secularism’ during the campaign; and he was right.7 Lest I should be accused of tarring the entire Hindu community with the saffron brush, I must stress that there’s still a pretty solid core of liberal Hindus who have actively resisted the Hinduization of India and continue to do so.
But they are becoming increasingly marginalized amid creeping majoritarianism flowing from a widespread belief that Hindu sensitivities have been ignored for too long in the name of secularism. And this Hindu sense of grievance—real or imaginary—will have to be addressed in the larger interest of good community relations.The view that only minorities are entitled to air their grievances and that the Hindus are too privileged to complain by virtue of being in the majority is misplaced. It is largely informed by our experience of majoritarian theocracies such as in the Arab world and authoritarian countries like China. But there are multicultural democracies where dominant groups can often feel left out as a ‘neutral’ state tries to protect and promote minority interests. For example, in the predominantly white United Kingdom (UK) and United States of America (USA), large sections of white working classes feel neglected and resent the fact that their governments spend so much time talking about the interests of racial and ethnic minorities.
Whether their sense of grievance is exaggerated or even imaginary is immaterial, what should worry us is the danger of ignoring these grievances and allowing them to fester. We have seen how populist nationalists in the US and Europe have exploited these to target ethnic minorities, blaming them for the ‘plight’ of native white groups and fuelling xenophobia. The Modi phenomenon itself is a product of this sense of grievance among Hindus.Having said that, there should be no room under the new compact for entertaining abstract grievances or demands around religious and cultural ‘sensitivities’ such as those that led to the demolition of Babri Masjid and the controversy surrounding Salman Rushdie’s book, The Satanic Verses. Both communities are guilty of touting spurious grievances and making demands citing religious or cultural sensitivities. The ‘new’ grown-up India should have an unambiguously no-nonsense approach to upholding the rule of law. Matters of ‘faith’ that can’t be tested in a court of law should have no place in a rule-based modern democracy. The good news is that a debate on the need to rethink Hindu–Muslim relations is already underway in the Muslim community disillusioned with the current secular order. Notwithstanding their public invocation of the Nehruvian idea of India, there’s a quiet Muslim acknowledgement that the post-Partition settlement has broken down. And that a new order is in town, and for the sake of their own physical and economic security, they will need to ‘fit in’. To re-emphasize the point made earlier, altered political realities and national mood require a new settlement between Muslims and the Indian state.A number of creative ideas are being tossed around.
Remarkably, these include accepting the idea of a Hindu Rashtra—something even most Hindus don’t feel comfortable with. Among its Muslim proponents are a number of legal luminaries such as constitutional scholar, Faizan Mustafa, vice chancellor of NALSAR University, Hyderabad. ‘But if Hindus really feel threatened from [sic] Muslims and Christians, we must address their concerns and not shy away from discussing the possibility of a Hindu rashtra,’ he wrote in a widely debated article in The Indian Express.8 ‘Minorities, too, are now fed up with this façade of secularism, with all state institutions tilting towards one religion. Perhaps some kind of Hindu Rashtra can help us bring peace and save the country from the path of self-destruction,’ he argued.9Minorities, he assured them, need not worry too much about it; ‘Just like several other modern theocracies, a Hindu Rashtra could guarantee substantial rights to religious minorities. It will not be based on the Manusmriti and will uphold modern ideas of human rights, particularly the right to equality and non-discrimination.’ He has made light of legal hurdles, arguing that it will ‘merely require a 15-judge Supreme Court bench to overrule the basic structure limitation on the Parliament’s power to amend the Constitution’—a reference on the bar on Parliament to change those provisions of the Constitution that are deemed essential to its ‘basic structure’.10 Secularism is one of them.
A few years ago, it would have been unthinkable for a prominent Muslim scholar to publicly propagate for the Hindu Rashtra—and for a leading national newspaper to publish it: the writer would have been declared persona non grata in their own community, accused of selling out to the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), and the paper would have been dubbed communal for promoting such an idea. However, it’s a measure of the temper of the times that Mustafa’s article has resonated widely in the Muslim community, with many complimenting him for giving voice to their views. The fact is that the idea of Hindu Rashtra has become a topic of kitchen-table discussion in Muslim homes, the dominant view being that a Hindu theocratic state will be a more honest alternative to the current charade of secularism; under a Hindu Rashtra minorities will be clearer about their status making it easier for them to adjust their expectations, which might ultimately lead to better Hindu–Muslim relations.There are several successful models of modern theocratic democracies where the state has an established religion, but all religious groups are treated as equal. These include Christian states of UK, Ireland, Greece, the Jewish state of Israel—the neighbouring Islamic state of Bangladesh and the Buddhist state of Sri Lanka. At least two major Southeast Asian Muslim-majority states—Malaysia and Indonesia—successfully combine elements of theocracy with a system of democratic rights for all citizens irrespective of their religion. These models are discussed in more detail in the following chapter.But right now, the most important task for those of us who are serious about bridging the Hindu–Muslim divide is to start a dispassionate and grown-up debate on the way forward—framed, not as an argument for a Hindu Rashtra, but as an attempt to break the current impasse and explore alternatives to our experiment with secularism that, for all its good intentions, has failed to satisfy either the majority community or minority faith groups. People must be presented with alternatives and invited to examine them in the cold light of the fact that the current situation is untenable and, if allowed to fester, would only benefit radicals in both communities, leading to more communal tensions, possibly, even irrevocable violence. Before it’s too late, sensible and peace-loving Hindus and Muslims—and I firmly believe that the overwhelming majority on both sides are sensible and peace-loving—must seize the initiative to find a dignified way out of the quagmire of worsening community relations.
But it will require party politics, sectarian opportunism, and, crucially, the Left–Right intellectual divide (not to mention liberal political correctness) to take second place to the more pressing task of settling, once and for all, the long-standing contentious issue of the status of minorities in a Hindu-majority India through and mutual consent. And a big part of this dialogue will involve creating conditions for a sustained and productive dialogue between the communities. Even as I believe Muslims will need to sacrifice more, a successful breakthrough can be achieved only when both sides reach out to each other in a spirit of accommodation. The responsibility of improving Hindu–Muslim relations cannot be left to one community alone. It takes two to tango.
For any Muslim initiative to take off, much less succeed, the BJP and the RSS will need to respond with a measure of reciprocity, indeed, even magnanimity, to reach out to minorities, offering them a deal they cannot refuse. It will make the task of pro-change Muslim campaigners much easier, not to mention, give the majority community a moral high ground. Meanwhile, before I wrap up, it is worth reiterating and re-emphasizing the thrust of my central argument, namely, that there is no ignominy in acknowledging our historic failure to make a success of our experiment with secularism. As pointed out before, history is littered with corpses of well-intentioned political projects. Vladimir Lenin’s model of socialism failed, but that doesn’t detract from his brave attempt to transform a poor peasant society into a modern, progressive and egalitarian nation. The problem was a refusal to acknowledge when it failed to work and take corrective measures; by the time they did, it was too late. Look at what has happened to Pakistan because it remains in denial that Jinnah’s idea of a liberal Muslim state was a non-starter. In India, it’s still not too late to be upfront and make a course correction. Once again, the words of Sahir Ludhianvi ring true—when it is not possible to take a story to its logical conclusion, it’s better to introduce a twist in the tale and move on from there.
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