Azaad: Free Read | WHEN A DOME FELL
When a Dome Fell
I soon realized that this would not be the only occasion when the PM would not honour his word. It was 6 December 1992. The Babri mosque in Ayodhya was demolished by a rampaging mob. The incident led to large-scale violence in many parts of the country—riots broke out and a few terror attacks took place. The country went through traumatic times, and the Rao government as well as the party in general, and the PM in particular, came under serious attack. In fact, I believe that the demolition was the only black spot on the Rao government; otherwise Rao’s tenure was one of the best in terms of performance. The economy was in good shape and the poor, the middle-income and high-income groups were all happy. The demolition presented a major crisis for the Rao government. People held the government, especially the PM and Home Minister S.B. Chavan, responsible for being a party to the demolition, directly or indirectly. But in my view, the government could not be held responsible because the Supreme Court had given permission to the Kar Sevaks to gather there. Nonetheless, there was a strong buzz within and outside the Congress party that, notwithstanding the court permission, Rao and Chavan should have anticipated the worst since thousands of people in a frenzied state of mind would be gathering at
the disputed site.
Anything could have happened. No doubt, the Kar Seva was being led by senior and responsible members of the BJP. But once the mob goes wild, even the leaders find it impossible to control it. The government could have, as a matter of abundant precaution, ordered the deployment of central paramilitary forces at the disputed site and nearby well before the incident. They could have intervened to save the situation. Unfortunately, that was not done. What was even more unfortunate was that the PM and home minister were not reachable from the morning when the demolition of the mosque began: They could not be contacted over the phone. It was only after the demolition that the Cabinet was convened at four in the evening. When it became clear that the mob, equipped with all sorts of tools to demolish the mosque, was getting aggressive, had the home minister been accessible or the Cabinet convened earlier, steps could have been taken to rush paramilitary forces. It is possible that by the time the forces arrived, the damage would have been done.
But at least the government, especially the PM and the home minister,could have been absolved of the allegation that they did nothing to stop the demolition. Further, the Union government had no control over the state police machinery, and trusting the word of the state government headed by Kalyan Singh—that everything would be under control on 6 December at the Ayodhya site—was not justified. And so, in the Cabinet meeting in the immediate aftermath of the demolition, it was decided to dismiss the four BJP-ruled state governments—UP, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Himachal Pradesh—for their complicity in the demolition.
The winter session of Parliament was on when the incident happened. The Opposition parties demanded Rao’s resignation for his alleged failure to prevent the demolition. The Opposition did not allow Parliament to function. As the parliamentary affairs minister, it was my responsibility to find a way out. The solution was not an easy one. I held several meetings, both with senior Opposition leaders and other like-minded parties, in groups and one-on-one.
I explained to them that demanding the PM’s resignation was neither reasonable nor acceptable. If he quit, the government would fall. Since no other party or group had the numbers to replace the Rao government, elections would have to be called, which the country could not afford in such a charged atmosphere. I suggested a way out, saying that instead of the PM, Home Minister Chavan could tender his resignation. After all, law and order was his subject. After much hemming and hawing, the Opposition parties and other like-minded leaders agreed. I extracted a commitment from them that once the decision was made, they would let the House function. The PM was not a part of these discussions, nor did he even once take the initiative to break the impasse.I went to Rao’s residential office with the formula. Rajesh Pilot, MoS for communications, who was by chance in my room at that time, accompanied me. The PM heard me out and asked me to contact
Chavan and convey the decision. I declined, saying that he, as the PM, should seek the resignation.
However, he insisted that I must go to Chavan’s residence and ‘prepare’ him for the resignation and then ask him to see Rao at his Parliament office at 4.00 p.m. The PM also told me to be present at the meeting. I requested Pilot to accompany me to Chavan’s residence, but he politely declined. Hence, I left for Chavan’s residence alone. I met him around 12.30 p.m.; he was asleep and had to be woken up. After having a general discussion, I told him that the PM desired that he step down so that Parliament could resume its work. He readily agreed. I also conveyed to him about the 4 p.m. meeting to be held at the PM’s Parliament office. After leaving Chavan’s residence, I went to see the PM again and told him Chavan had agreed to resign, so I could tell the waiting Opposition leaders to resume the functioning of Parliament after lunch.
The PM agreed to the proposal, and I informed the leaders accordingly. Post lunch, the Parliament session resumed its work, three–four days post the demolition. At 4.00 p.m., as decided earlier in the day, both the PM and I were in his office in Parliament House, waiting for Chavan to turn up. We waited until 6.00 p.m., having many rounds of tea and calling the home minister’s residence and office every 15 minutes, but there was no trace of Chavan. I was very upset since after my meeting with the PM and Chavan, I had to convey the decision of his resignation to the Opposition parties.
When Chavan did not turn up, Rao threw up his hands and said that we could not wait any longer. He suggested that we return to our respective homes. Parliament had already conducted the business of the day. The PM added that he would contact the home minister later in the night and ask him to resign and that I should take the Opposition into confidence and ensure the smooth functioning of Parliament. I did as he said, and from the next morning, again with my assurance of my previous day that Chavan would resign, the House resumed normal functioning. However, I was cautious not to make that commitment on the floor of the House.
One day passed, two days went by and then three, but there was no sign of Chavan’s resignation. The Opposition began getting restless, and I rushed to the PM. He told me with a straight face that Chavan had ‘disappeared’. He could not contact him! ‘Let’s forget it,’ he remarked. I had to cut a sorry figure before the Opposition leaders who had taken my word at face value and allowed the House to function smoothly. It goes to their credit that despite feeling cheated, they did not make an issue of the deal that I had struck with them to elicit their cooperation. Had they done so and proceeded to disrupt the House yet again, I would have had a hard time explaining the situation to the Opposition and the public.
Anyway, things ended well for our government. Neither Rao nor the home minister had to quit, and the House resumed functioning normally. Consequently, both saved their chairs; only the masjid got demolished and four BJP state governments were dismissed. In retrospect, I feel strongly that in politics, personal relations matter the most. Had I not had personal relations with the Opposition leaders, they would not have spared me. Unfortunately, such camaraderie is missing today. Today, when I think about it, I realize that Rao had played a crafty trick on me.
After I left his residence at noon to meet Chavan with the commitment that I would seek the home minister’s resignation on the PM’s direction, he must have contacted Chavan, with whom he shared a great personal rapport and friendship since their student days, when Marathwada, the hometown of Chavan, was part of Hyderabad State before Partition. Rao must have advised him to go underground for some time and resurface after the storm blew over.
Behind Rao’s soft and scholarly demeanour lurked a shrewd political mind. He could have sacked his minister, regardless of Chavan’s unavailability, but he did not do so. He could have called up the minister in my presence and asked him to quit, but he did not do that either. Clearly, the PM was buying time as he had no desire to axe Chavan. It reminds me of Rao’s famous quote: ‘Not taking a decision is also a decision! Not just decisions, Rao was also reluctant to implement the suggestions given by his ministers. This was in sharp contrast to Indira ji and Rajiv, who would always take my suggestions seriously and implement them.
I realized Rao was a different kettle of fish. In 1992, the president of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan visited India. The PM had hosted a dinner in his honour at Hyderabad House. I, too, was present on the occasion. Prime Minister Rao and the UAE leader were seated opposite each other and I was made to sit to the right of the president, as per protocol. There was also an Indian interpreter just behind the two of us. After a few minutes went by with Rao and the UAE head of State discussing something, the UAE leader asked about me. I introduced myself. On learning that I was from J&K, he immediately turned his complete attention towards me. In no time, he was asking me several questions and I began replying to them. Rao would intervene but was met with monosyllabic responses from the guest.
The visiting dignitary told me that he had heard negative things about Kashmir from Pakistan—that it was isolated from the rest of India and that its residents did not have even basic amenities. I said that this perception was not true at all. I added that former PM Indira ji’s emphasis had been on food, shelter and clothing for all, and this was being followed by successive governments. I added that while there were pockets in the country where people did not have a house of their own, every resident of Kashmir had a house, food and clothing. I reiterated that there was no major problem of unemployment in J&K as the tourism, handicrafts and horticulture sectors provided jobs and that not a single resident of the state slept on an empty stomach. The visiting dignitary said he had not been aware of these achievements and that India’s neighbouring countries had beenpicture of Kashmir.
He added that India needed to be more efficient in spreading positivity about Kashmir to the global audience. After the dinner was over and the dignitary had left, Rao asked me to accompany him in his car. On the way, he exclaimed that he didn’t know I had known the visiting dignitary before. I said that I had met him for the first time, which surprised him because going by how the UAE leader had been talking to me, Rao had had the impression that we had known each other for long! I then narrated what the president of UAE had told me about Kashmir. On hearing this, Rao commented that we had to improve our public relations with the Gulf nations. A few months later, he suggested that I should pay a visit to the Gulf countries and promote the true picture of J&K and India as a whole. When the process was initiated, all Arab nations except Saudi Arabia gave the green signal. Riyadh was upset over the demolition of the Babri mosque and cold-shouldered us.
During my visit, I had extensive interactions with senior members of the Gulf nations’ governments, including their heads of government. They were all unanimous in their criticism of our public relations and the limited interaction between the leadership of both nations. They pointed out that while Pakistan regularly sent high-level delegations to their respective countries, there were almost none from India. Get your public relations act together, they said. I briefed PM Rao on my return and suggested that we disptach a high level delegation, comprising mainly Muslims, to those countries.
He agreed, but then nothing happened. He did not follow up on my advice. The fact is that no Indian PM, with the exception of Indira ji, had been able to develop cordial and personal relationships with the leaders of Gulf countries. It should have been relatively easy for our PMs to do so because, unlike in the case of other democratic countries where the real power was not always vested with the head of the government, the heads of States in Gulf countries held all the power.
It must be pointed out here that PM Modi has, to some extent, made an effort to develop a personal relationship with Gulf leaders. The focus of all governments in New Delhi has generally been on ensuring official visits to Western countries and the US. There is nothing wrong with that, since it is necessary considering our economic and security-related inter dependence issues. But we must not forget that the Gulf nations have a large Indian diaspora that is employed there.
If we have good relations with the Gulf, it will lead to a better work environment for Indians living there—it would positively impact their job security, pay and social welfare benefits. Besides, we receive considerable amounts of remittances from Indians working there. In addition, more frequent visits by high-level Indian delegations would help us level the propaganda that Pakistan and anti- India nations have unleashed against us. It’s never too late. We live in a dynamic world and should seize the initiative.
Sometime in 1993, I reminded the PM that general elections were due in sometime and that I would like to give more time to the party for preparations and campaigning, so I would have no time for parliamentary work. I requested him to relieve me of that responsibility. He appreciated my commitment to the party and gave the parliamentary affairs charge to Vidya Charan Shukla. He was a shrewd and experienced politician but had no personal contact with the Opposition leaders or with even Congress leaders since he had changed parties two–three times between 1988 and 1991. He had been minister in the governments of both PM V.P. Singh and Chandra Shekhar, besides being Cabinet minister with Indira ji. This was followed by a ministerial berth in Rao’s government.
Within a few months of my relinquishing charge, our government faced a vote of no confidence in July 1993. Shukla failed to get the numbers on our side on account of lack of effective coordination with other parties. As a result, the cash-for-votes scam broke out.
There was a huge furore in Parliament, and the government’s very survival became an issue. Rao moved swiftly and reappointed me as parliamentary affairs minister to do the fire-fighting.
My return to the old portfolio was greeted with much applause in Parliament, both from the Opposition and like-minded party benches, with some senior leaders later telling me that they had cautioned the PM against the decision to shift me out.